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A computer simulation model was developed (Interactive Simulation of System
Performance, or ISSP) simulating the integrated performance of hard-kill (surface-to-
air missile, or SAM, and close-in weapon system, or CIWS) and soft-kill (defensive
jammer, or ECM, and Chaff) systems in the defense of a single naval ship against
attack threat by four anti-ship missiles (ASM). The quantitative contribution of each
system to ship survivability is evaluated. The hard-kill and soft-kill weapon systems are
the focus of the two major anti-air warfare (AAW) improvement plans assessed in this
simulation. Based on these plans, six decision options were created. In addition, this
study provides an analysis and comparison of the results of the inner air battle
abstracted from various weapon models. Finally, the use of the simulation results in
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An Iraqi anti-ship missile struck the USS Stark on the evening of May 17, 1987.
Stark's SLQ-32 did not detect the incoming missile. None of the defensive weapons,
missiles, guns or chaff decoys were employed. As a general mle, the Stark's combat
system should have had a high probability of shooting down the anti-ship missile if
any of the sensors had detected the inbound threat. As illustrated by this tragedy, the
question of how to improve ship survivability has become a matter of great importance
for modem warfare.
The anti-ship missiles can be launched from aircraft, surface vessels, or
underwater submarines, and this potential threat can cause extreme damage, as the
Stark tragedy indicates. Because of the complexity of the defense problem and the
variety of defensive systems available, it is often helpful to estimate the combat
effectiveness of combinations of various weapon systems by analytic techniques before
developing or purchasing those systems. Furthermore, it is necessary to include tactical
considerations. To enhance the defense. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems should be
used on the ship to reduce the effect^ eness of attacking, low flying missiles, therefore
increasing the survivability of the ship. This includes Electronic Warfare Support
measures (ESM), Active Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). and Chaff decoys.
The ship whose defense is to be simulated, is assumed to be equipped with an
Anti-air Warfare (AAW) combat sy<;tem which consists of an air search radar, two
missile fire control radars, one missile launcher, a close-in weapon system (CIWS),
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and electronic warfare systems. The electronic warfare simulations in this thesis
project, focus on the jamming and decoying of a radar guided anti-ship missile and
leave the discussion of an infra-red guided threat for future work.
B. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The primary goal of this thesis is to simulate the performance of a combined
active and Electronic Warfare system in the defense of a single naval ship against
simultaneous attack by four low flying anti-ship missiles (ASM) and to evaluate the
contribution of the total system to ship survivability.
Another objective is to simulate the interactions between altemative hard-kill
(SAM, CIWS) and soft-kill (ECM, ChafO systems, to analyze the outcomes, and to
show the contribution of each sub-system in defeating the incoming threat. Finally, the
use of the simulation results in making choices between candidate weapon systems is
illustrated.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
The scope of this thesis wUl be limited to an AAW operation conducted by a
number of defense layers which depends on the weapon systems assumed to be on the
ship. This work does not fully describe an operational capability. It deals with an
abstraction of the sort typically used to support decision-making in the areas of system
research, development and acquisition. Most of the components and factors used here
are generic since the real ones are specific to particular systems and are generally
classified.
TTie basic defense scenario is discussed in Chapter II. This depicts the
employment of combinations of active and EW weapon systems, including the Surface-
to-air MissiJes (SAM), CTWS, defensive jammer and Chaff. Chapter ITT covers the
simulation program, language, and flow charts. Two major modules, are also provided
there, covering hard-kill and soft-kill systems. The SAM and CTWS sub-modules are
taken from an earlier Naval Postgraduate School thesis.''' The simulation of the
performances of the electronic warfare components of the defense and their interactions
with the hard-kill systems are contributions of this effort. The simulation results and
the analysis of them are included in Chapter TV, along with an evaluation of
improvement plans for AAW weapon systems, integrated performance of active and
EW systems, and their performance under hostile JEunming conditions. The results of
these evaluations provide data useful in making choices among various systems options.
Chapter V summarizes conclusions based on this study.
II. THE DEFENSE SCENARIO
A. ACTIVE SYSTEMS
1. Surface-fo-Air Missile (SAM)
From the point of view of the ship which carries it, the primary attributes
of a SAM system are the size and number of the missiles, their propellants (which
may require special storage), the rate of fire demanded, and the size and weight of
the guidance system(s). All add together as ship effectiveness: a ship which carries
a high effectiveness SAM system is first of all a SAM ship and second something else,
but almost any ship can carry a low effectiveness SAM.^*' ^ '' '"^^
The SAMs are the most effective weapons against anti-ship missUes or
aircraft, although guns are used at very short distances. Naval SAMs are generally
classified as area defense which protect several ships and point defense that are self-
protective only. In fact, the differentiation between area defense and point defense is
not as clear as might be supposed. Of course, the former is for long range defense,
and the latter is for short range defense, but where the transition occurs is not well
defined. In looking at SAM systems, effectiveness is the preferable distinction. Those
that have higher effectiveness should have greater capabDity as they affect the ships
which carry them.
In the past, the radar systems were not sufficient to determine accurate target
position or characteristics and an additional Target Indication radar was required, but
modem radars can combine both tasks. Having identified a target, the information is
passed to a tracker radar assigned to it. TTie Tracker radar antenna is mounted with
an antenna which provides the illuminating beam for the missile homing and a small
aiilenna used to communicate with the missile.'"'^ ^ p 2<j
Point defense missiles can be used against anti-ship missiles, but were not
originally designed for this, and, at least initially, did not have the right kind of
warhead. Because the time between detection of an approaching missile and its impact
on the target ship may be very short, especially if the incoming missile is at low
altitude, a point defense missile must have a very short reaction time. ,,
The point defense missUes have different ranges. Britain has the Sea Cat
with a range of 4.5 km and a missile weighing 68 kg. France uses the Sea Crotale
with a range of 8.5 km and a missUe weighing 80 kg. America has developed the Sea
Sparrow with a range of 25 km and a missile launch weight of 220 kg, over three
times that of the Sea Cat. In addition. Sea Chaparral(US), Sea Wolf(UK), SLAM(UK),
Hirondelle(France), Marine Roland(France/Germany), Albatross(Italy), SAN7(USSR) are
in current inventories. >
The area defense missile system must have a long-range surveillance radar
which consistently scans the horizon for potential enemy targets. The defensive
missiles have a range varying from 45 km to about 100 km. The British Sea Dart has
a range of 55 km and a missile launch weight of 550 kg. The United States uses the
Standard SM-1 with a range of 60 km and a missile launch weight of 590 km.
Standard SM-2 with a range of 100 km and a missile launch weight of 1,060 kg. TTie
French Masurka MK2 has a range of 45 km and a missile launch weight of 1.850 kg.
Besides these, US Talos(120 km), UK Sea Slug 11(45 km), USSR SAN2(40 km),
SAN3(32 km). SAN4(32 km) are al<^o involved.
Most of the SAMs use semi-active homing to home onto their target. In
tliis guidance system a radar beam from the ship is aimed at the target; the missile
homes on the reflected radar energy which is detected by a radar receiver in the
missile. The advantages of this system are that there is no radar transmitter required
for the missile itself and the homing becomes more accurate as the missile approaches
its target compared to the method which controls the missile from the ship.
2. Close-in Weapon System
Modem fast-firing, automatic guns, known as Close-in Weapon Systems
(CIWS), have shovm from experience that if properly controlled they are able to shoot
down anti-ship missiles. The guns generally do not initiate this engagement until the
anti-ship missile is some 3,700 meters from the ship, because it only takes a short time
for the tracking radar to track the missile. This does not provide much firing time, but
given that the guns can shoot down or explode the missOe before it reaches some 185
meters away, no damage should come to the ship.
The location of the CIWS in the vessel is generally a compromise. To
avoid stability problems it is best to keep a system low down on the ship. However,
this very often conflicts with the need to establish good operating arcs. In an
integrated system, the effect of radar sidelobes on surrounding structure might give rise
to a higher false-alarm rate. Fire-control channels should offer balanced cover around
the ship, with each positioned to optimize the firing arcs. In particular, firing arcs
should overlap as far as possible, to minimize dead zones lacking defensive cover.
The gun has an apparent advantage at very short range: it can come into
action more rapidly than a mis<=ile. and. moreover, it does not share the minimum
range problem of the missile. Therefore, it is useful against targets that give very little
warning time, such as low-altitude anti-ship missiles. Nevertheless, such applications
are quite different from the typical use of naval guns for anti-aircraft purpose. The
ideal close-in weapon system offers the following:^'^ * ^ '"^ ;:
Reliable, long-range target detection over a wide coverage arc, with
sophisticated ECCM, anti-clutter and all-weather capability. - '
,
Fast reaction time, with completely automatic functioning from threat
evaluation and designation to target destruction. - ' .. . ,' .yut-
Image-free tracking from dual -frequency radars together with whatever
sensor(s) are appropriate for the conditions. ? '
Accurate fire control incorporating automatic spotting corrections, particularly
for longer-range engagements, and curved-course prediction for use against missiles
with pre-programmed course-change capabilities.
High-response mount with "stiff servos for rapid reaction and engagement
of close-in targets, and wide arcs of fire.
Cannon with high muzzle velocity and rate of fire.
Ammunition with low ballistic dispersion and high energy content, plus
proximity-fuzed rounds for use at longer ranges.
Most of these qualities could be embodied in a modular fire-control system
which consists of a single quite accurate medium-range gun (40 mm/50 mm) with
nearby correlated radar and electro-optical tracking system. Hostile target detection,
selection and designation would be executed by an individual centralized facility. An
example is the Phalanx system which uses a Vulcan 20 mm, six-barrelled Gatling gun,
giving a rate of fire up to 3,000 rpm.
B. ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
Electronic Warfare is defined as that division of the military employment of
electromagnetic energy involving, on the one hand, actions taken to determine, exploit,
prevent, or reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy and, on
the other hand, action taken to retain one's own effectiveness. There are three
categories in Electronic Warfare: Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) which
must be able to detect and classify the enemy signals within a given frequency band;
Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) which include the techniques that permit one to
disturb or interfere with hostUe electronic systems; and Electronic Counter-
Countermeasures (ECCM), a term covering all those actions taken to protect friendly
electronic systems from hostile ECM and to diminish enemy detection and utility of
one's own EW systems. Some components of EW systems, relating to this study, will
be discussed as follows:
1. Electronic Warfare Support Measures
ESM is that division of Electronic Warfare involving actions taken to search
for, intercept, locate, and immediately identify radiated electromagnetic energy for the
purpose of immediate RF emitter recognition. Thus, ESM provides a source of
information required for immediate action involving ECM, ECCM, avoidance, targeting,
and other tactical employment of forces. ^'^ '•''"*^''
ESM systems can operate in a very dense electromagnetic environment, can
classify emitters by type from an internal "Data Base" and can be employed to direct
jammers. A receiver that detects signals over a wide band of frequencies may be used
by an ESM system. An example of that i<j a radar warning receiver fPWR) which
intercepts radar signals and identifies their relative threat in real time. Using deliberate
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and non-deliberate enemy radiations, ESM is the ears and the eyes of the military
coiiunander. ESM data, compared with an appropriate data base, can offer the
commander a complete picture of the RF-emitters active in a particular area. *- ' '
ESM has the capacity of identifying enemy radiations from such sensors as
radars, lasers, and sonars at much longer distances than the maximum detection range
of those sensors. There is a very important advantage of ESM: it is completely
passive when used as a detector of hostile systems. On the other hand, its
disadvantage is that it gives bearing-only data on an emitter. The distance to the
intercepted target must be determined by triangulation from multiple ESM receiver
tuned to the emitter or by active reconnaissance.
To defeat ESM systems, a military force generally practices emission control
(EMCON), which restricts transmissions untU it knows it has been detected. Active
or radiating weapons are often designed such that the active sensor is only tumed on
for the terminal phase of the attack (on the order of 10 to 30 seconds), so that
minimum warning and reaction time is given to the target. Completely passive
weapons such as anti-radiation missiles and heat-seeking missiles provide no warning
from ESM.f^'' "^ " '^
ESM is different from signal intelligence (SIGINT). The former focuses
on tactical functions that require instant actions. SIGINT is for intelligence gathering
and contains three parts: electronic intelligence (ELTNT), communications intelligence
(COMINT), and radiation intelligence (RADINT). Electronic Warfare is very highly
reliant on intelligence and it is important to collect in peacetime as much detail as
possible about potential enemy system^;. It is necessan^ to get detailed information
on radar and other signals associated with foreign systems. A variety of platforms
surface, airborne or satellite can collect the information and provide it to an ESM
"Data Base". It is also very importaiH for intelligence to observe and project trends
in science, weapon technology and military philosophy to make sure that any element
of EW equipment will be useful when it is finally developed and enters service.
2. Electronic Countermeasures
The first large-scale application of electronics in military operations occurred
during World War 11. Since that time, the weapons systems have increasingly used
electronics, frequently to the point of dominance. However, the importance of
countermeasures has grown correspondingly due to the growing dep)endence of modem
weapons on electronics and in recognition of their vulnerability.
There are three categories that are used to classify individual ECM tactics
or techniques. But it should be noted that many ECM techniques from all categories
could be applied simultaneously in a given tactical situation: ''^'^ '•'' '"^
- The fu-st category, known as Active ECM, includes all jammers; i.e. all ECM
devices that radiate electromagnetic energy of themselves. Noise jammers and repeater
jammers are the two major groups within this category. Either can be used for self-
screening of the jamming platform of for support of multi-platform forces. Active
Expendable Jammers and Active Decoys are also included.
- The second category, known as passive ECM, comprises all ECM devices that
do not radiate electromagnetic energy of themselves and that are not part of the
vehicle/s involved. Although absorptive or refractive chaff and passive reflector are
included, the most important technique in this area is reflective chaff.
- The third categor\' include*; all ECM technique*; which would diminish the
radar cross section of a vehicle by using special vehicle constmction methods or
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materials. Confusing or attempting to deny proper enemy weapon system operation by
Maneuvering Tactics are involved. Also included are Absorption Coverings. The
primary actions of Electronic Countermeasures are to prevent the function of enemy
surveillance devices, communications, weapons, and in general to reduce his ability to
exploit the electromagnetic spectrum. The function of these devices can be prevented
in varying degrees by giving wrong information or contradicting information. TTie
final result of the use of ECM may be a practical destruction, as in the premature
firing of a warhead due to confusion of a radar fusing system.
ECM includes jamming and deception. The deliberate radiation or reflection
of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the employment of electronic
devices, equipment, or systems being used by a hostile force belongs to jamming.
Deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, reflection of
electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead a hostile force in the
interpretation or use of information received by his electronic systems. Manipulative
and imitative are the two categories of deception. Manipulative implies the alteration
or simulation of friendly electromagnetic signals into hostile channels wliich imitates
a hostile emission.
Disrupting, and deceiving are the other two major features of ECM. The
broad objectives of most ECM systems are to deny the enemy the information he
seeks, or to surround his return with so much false target data that the information
cannot be extracted, or to supply so much false data that the information handling
capacity of the victim system is swamped.
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3. Chaff
Chaff is defined in standard dictionaries, as the husks of grain or anything
that is useless. This definition applies to the electronic field today, because the radar
operator sees chaff reflections as useless false targets.
Chaff is now a general term that is defmed as follows: elemental passive
reflectors, absorbers, or refractors of radar, communication and other weapons system
radiations, which can be floated or otherwise suspended in the atmosphere or
exoatmosphere for the purpose of confusing, screening or otherwise adversely effecting
the performance of victim electronic systems. Examples are: metal foils, metal coated
dielectrics (aluminum, silver and zinc on nylon or glass being the most common),
aerosols, stringballs, rope, and semiconductors. The most usual reference is made to
the thin metallic or metallic-coated dielectric strips or rods of various lengths and
frequency responses that passively reflect confusion targets, clouds, or corridors to
victim radars.
Chaff is the oldest, and still the most widely used, radar countermeasure.^*'
6. p 183] jsj^y^ ships use chaff for self-protection against radar guided anti-ship missile.
Shipboard personnel can use chaff very efficiently to protect their own ship or to save
other units in their own task force. Because of the speed of threatening weapons, it
is important that the reaction time from fire initiation to chaff bloom be short and that
the chaff cloud be placed accurately. Because it has a limited effective lifetime, it is
also necessary that the chaff clouds he renewed at the correct interval.
For the naval application, chaff is most commonly ejected from rockets,
shells, or mortars. Naval rockets can carry up to 7 kg of chaff, and mortar systems
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typically dispense up to 3 kg of chaff from several grenades fired simultaneously.
There are two major modes of chaff use at sea:
a. Before anti-ship missiles are launched at some distance from the vessel,
a pattern of several rockets or shells fired in different directions is used to provide
alternate targets to them. Rockets and shells can dispense the distraction decoys at
range up to 2 km from the vessel. The decoys may last for several minutes, and, if
the threat is still present, more decoys are periodically sown. Therefore, the hostile
force is confused by the chaff cloud and can not distinguish between real and false
targets.
b. This mode is used closer to the vessel, denying range information to the
seeker, and in conjunction with active jamming to lure the attacking missile away. It
should be realized that there is a large echoing area within a few seconds of firing the
chaff near the ship. The centroid of the chaff is very close to the ship, when the chaff
cloud is dispensed at a range of about 100 to 400 meters. The ship then moves
quickly out of, and away from, the chaff echo and the missile is lured away, thus
avoiding a direct hit.
The second mode can be achieved with rockets or mortars and is regarded
as a last resort tactic, which will succeed best with vessels of relatively small radar
cross section, such as small, fast patrol boats. For naval use, multipath effects can be
used with advantage where the free-space radar cross section of a chaff cloud is greatly
enhanced by its proximity to the sea. Significant enhancement can be achieved with
clouds up to 200 meters above the sea surface, depending upon the height and range
of the seeker. Naval chaff systems are generallv designed to achieve the required radar
cross section in the order of 30 to 60 seconds.
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C. OEFFNSE PLATFORM
There are various kind of trajectories that anti-ship missiles can be programmed
to pursue, such as diving at steep angles from high elevation and sea-skimming. By
using multiple way-point manoeuvers, several can arrive from different directions
simultaneously (see Fig 11- 1). In order to be efficient against such attacks, the
defensive system must have a very short reaction time, approximately hemispherical
coverage and a high kill probability against multiple attacks. In the real world, a task
force of ships would depend on a layered defense containing combat air patrols,
electronic jamming, anti-missile missiles and guns to counter the anti-ship missile
attack.
In general, a warship is equipped with weapons systems, such as missiles and
guns, with which it can assault assailants or protect itself. This is the so called hard-
kill. In addition to these equipments which defend by destroying their targets, a ship
will be equipped with soft-kill equipment, for example, the electronic warfare systems
discussed above, which can be applied in defense to confuse and deflect enemy hard-
kill weapons. It requires information which is provided by sensors, primarily radars
and ESM equipment, in order to operate these components properly. The information
would be computed and controlled by the ship's combat information center, then sent
to the individual defensive elements. In high speed modem warfare, the coordinating
function, giving an efficient integration when various; kinds of weapon operate together,
is very important.
An anti-ship missile, whether launched from an aircraft or a ship, essentially has







Figure II-l The various types of trajectories which anti-
ship missile can be programmed.
active radar, by infrared sensors, by a TV camera carried in the missile or by the
missile homing on to the radar transmission beam of the ship. So far the most general
method is active radar where the missile carried its own radar and uses the reflected
beam from the target to home on it.
ECM has been developed to deal with all these methods. Radar jammers, chaff
and IR decoy launchers are provided. The radar lock of incoming missiles can be
broken and TV homers can be defeated hy smokescreens and strong lights shone on
the missiles' TV camera.
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The anti-missile guns of the close-in weapons system (a hard-kill weapon) will
be assigned tc» defeat the missiles which aie not destroyed (i.e. succeed iii penetrating
the defenses) when they are within 3.8 kilometers of the warship. CIWS is assigned
to explode the warhead of the incoming missile prematurely. Even though some
fragments at such close range will very likely reach the ship, these will result in much
less damage than a warhead exploding directly on the warship.
This simulation includes three layers of platform self-defense. The first layer is
SAM for medium range defense . The second layer is EW for countering the missiles
which leak through the fust layer up to the point of impact. The last layer is CIWS
for those missiles within its defensive region.
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III. THE SIMULATION PROCRAM
A. BRIEF OF THE SIMULATION
Interactive simulation of system perfomiance (ISSP) is an interactive Monte Carlo
simulation of an engagement between a warship and attacking anti-ship missiles (ASM).
The engagement is complicated due to the many factors that are involved. The
simulation is able to simulate the operations of the engagements between four
simultaneously attacking ASM and three different defense layers. The defense scenario
follows the systems' performance from the search phase to the eventual kill or impact
of the ASMs.
The simulation is based on a simplified operational model of the reality. It has
been simplified by giving deterministic values for operational parameters, such as radar
detection range, probability of kill, reaction time for hard-kill and soft-kill systems, and
the impact of enemy jamming. The present simulation is in the form of a desk-top
computer program consisting of two modules. The hard-kill module includes Surface-
to-air Missiles (SAM) which deal with medium range defense and Close-in Weapon
Systems (CIWS) which deal with short range defense. This module was reported in
an earlier Naval Postgraduate School thesis^'' and has been combined by the author into
one large program with the soft-kill module. The soft-kLl] module contains an EW
system, simulating the defense of the ship by defensive jammer (ECM^ and Chaff.
To begin a simulation nm. assumed values for all of the parameters are input into
the computer. The models are then run. using the parameters and random numbers to
evaluate the outcomes of the interactions hetween elements of the defense and the
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attacking ASM. After storing the results, the models are run again and again with
new sets of random numbers to generate a sample size adequate for statistical analysis.
At the end of the simulation, the results for the desired number of iterations are
computed, the output data are displayed as the expected number of SAM fired and
ASM leaking through each defense configuration, the percentage of the anti-ship
missiles destroyed by hard-kill and/or soft-kill systems, and the basic analysis of the
ship survivability.
B. THE PROGRAM LANCJL'AC.E
ISSP is written in Borland TURBO BASIC, which is a programming language
commonly supplied with PC-DOS. This language version is a compiled language,
therefore, much faster than a strictly interpreted language, such as Advanced Basic
(BASICA) from IBM. But, the speed is not as fast as other computer simulation
languages, such as FORTRAN, SIMSCRIPT, GPSS, and SLAM. In order to follow
the previous development of the hard-kill module simulation package at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the compiled language TURBO BASIC was preferred. This is
due to the fact that speed is not important in this simulation. The user needs to be
able to input some basic information at the beginning of the program and to follow
the output events at the end of the program.
The computer used for this simulation is an IBM personal computer (IBM-PC)
or 100 ^c IBM PC compntible clone In order to nin the simulation, one of these
computers must be equipped with a color/black-white monitor, at least one floppy disk
driver, and the TITRBO BASIC software must be available. The simulation program,
ISSP. was written using the PC-DOS disk operating system Version 3.2. but any PC-
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DOS Version developed after Version 3.2 will work. Since the simulation must
interact with TIIRBO BASIC software and the disk operation system, therefore, no
guarantee can be provided that the simulation will run on other than IBM-PC or 100
% IBM-PC compatible computer.
The built-in RND Function in TURBO BASIC, which satisfactorily generates the
uniformly distributed pseudo-random numbers, was used to provide the random numbers
needed for this simulation. An input statement gives the seed value of the random
number generator and it is easily accessible from the main program. The random
numbers are used throughout ISSP to assess the outcome of a particular event, whether
it is successful or a failure.
C. FLOW OF THE PROGRAM
The flow of the program is summarized in Figure DI-l. First, the simulation is
started and it asks for the input parameters to be loaded, such as sample size, ASM
spacing, and mode number illustrated in Table III-l. Based on the mode chosen, it
wUl ask for P,, values of ECM and/or Chaff, and the jamming conditions to be
simulated. If jamming is used by the attackers, an effective detection range will be
requested. When the simulation starts running, it sets an elapsed time clock to zero,
because the clock can be used to track the total execution time, which is a reference
point for the user.
Since a number of vnrinb1e<5 are M<;ed for cumulative statistical purposes, it is also
necessary to set all these variables to zero at the beginning of the program. On the
other hand, those variables which will change with each repetition also must be set to
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Figure III-l Flow of the program
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program and how the program works in the first few stages. The following paragraphs
deal with the simulation of the air defense engagement.
TABLE ni-1 The Definition of Each State
MODE WEAPON SYSTEM
hard-kill system
1 hard-kill system and ECM
2 hard-kill system and Chaff
3 hard-kill system and combined ECM and Chaff
Once the search radar detects the incoming targets, the program will automatically
note the operational data, such as speed and heading of the incoming ASM targets, and
compute their position and time of impact. Furthermore, it can provide this
information to the simulated tracking radar for launching SAM against the threat. The
longer the detection range, the longer the time to impact. This increases the chances
for SAM to destroy the incoming targets. This program will calculate and check the
time and range of intercept, where the intercept time is the time from detection of the
incoming targets to intercept by SAM, and the intercept range is the distance from the
warship to intercept point. It is very important to check the intercept range, because
unless the range is above a pre-specified threshold value, the gyros' in the SAM
guidance system will not be stabilized.
Assessment time is the time lost in assessing whether a SAM has destroyed its
assigned target. If not. the ASM position and time to impact the worship are updated
and the engagement is repeated. Several loops in this program determine the
effectiveness of the SAM defense.
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From the EW defense point of view. ESM is activated all the time. Two kinds
of EW application are available in tiie real waj. One is dealing witii the outer battle,
the other is dealing with the inner battle. The former is to reduce or destroy the
capabUity of an enemy to launch or fire its weapon and this is beyond the scope of
this study. The latter is to counter or interrupt the weapon already fired by the enemy.
Once ESM detects the incoming ASM when it turns on its seeker, it will link to
defensive jammer (ECM) and Chaff. The defensive jammer could break the lock of
the incoming ASM seeker, so the seeker has to recycle again in order to track its
target. If the Chaff is launched and bloomed during the proper time, the seeker of the
incoming ASM might lock on the large radar cross section (RCS) provided by Chaff
instead of only on the warship. Then, the warship can be maneuvered away to avoid
the attack. The combination of defensive jammer and Chaff is the best case for EW
system to counter the threat. But, under some circumstances, this combination may not
be feasible. However, this program can simulate the individual defense of defensive
jammer and/or Chaff at the option of the user.
When the incoming ASM approaches to the CIWS defensive area, this system is
on and continues to carry out the defense. After five seconds reaction time to process
the data and lock on the target, it starts firing at the incoming ASM when it is within
the CIWS maximum intercept range, which is two NMs. Its maximum continuous
firing time is eight seconds. The assessment of results requires one second, and it will
be carried out following each firing procedure. If CFWS has not shot down the
engaged target, the above procedure will be recycled again until the engaged target
passes the minimum intercept range which is 0.1 NM. The ISSP program is able to
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implement the above process and compute the data needed to assess each event, such
as intercept time and intercept range.
After the pre-set number of simulation repetitions is completed, the final step is
to compute and summarize the data. The result could be printed out by either an
image writer or laser printer. The display includes the following information: the
expected number of SAM ftred, the expected number and percentage of ASM destroyed
by SAM, CIWS, with/without EW system, the expected number of targets which
penetrate through and hit the warship successfully, the P^ value for hard-kill system and
soft-kill system, and the ship survivability.
D. WEAPON SYSTEMS MODULE
As mention before, two major types of weapon systems are used in this
simulation known as hard-kill system and soft-kill systems. The discussion of this
section and the following section will be based on these two weapon modules.
1. Hard-Kill Systems Module
a. SAM Sub-Module
The SAM sub-module is the first one called by the program when the
simulation starts. Logically, it is the first engagement of the threat; the target has to
be detected if any engagement is to occur. This module simulates the major functions
of a SAM defense. The fundamental process of simulating the interactions of four
incoming targets and the SAM defense is summarized in Figure ITT 2. This network
shows the possible sequences of events as a SAM system operates against the incoming
threat. The real network in the program is more complicated due to the accurate
calculation of the timing of the impact and intercept events, and the sequencing of the
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Figure III-2 SAl-l Sub-Module
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activities of the Fire Control Radar (FCR) and SAM launches.
The input for this module is the position of the target at detection
(detection range), which at this time is simply on a straight and level flight path. The
predicted point of initial interception by a SAM can be determined as following:^'' '
p.l41
K = Roe, - ( T, X V^, ) (3-1)
''sAM ''^ ^ Ply ~ '^L " ( ''tot ^ ^ Fly )
^Fly ^ ''SAM *" '^TOT ) ~ '^L
Tp,, = Rl / ( Vs^ + V,o, ) (3-2)
Rin, = Vs^ X T^, (3-4)
or
Rin. = Rdc, - ( T^, X V^, ) (3-5)
where
*' Rjj^, : Detection range in NM
Rl : Target current range at time of SAM launch in NM
Ri„, : Intercept range in NM
* Vtot '• Target velocity in NM/sec
* VsAM : SAM velocity in NM/sec
* T, : The response time to Iniinch SAM in seconds
Ti„, : Intercept time in seconds
iii*ii
. These quantities are assumed parameter values input
to the simulation program at the beginning of each run.
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Tp,y : Flying time of SAM in seconds
Note ; The range is measured between warsliip and current SAM position.
The time of SAM is measured since detection occurred.
Example 3.1 TTiis example illustrates the computation of time and range for initial
intercept
Suppose that the weapon systems have the following characteristics:
Reaction time = 30 sec; R^, = 30 NMs; V^t = 10 NMs/Min = 0.167 NM/sec
Vj^ = 20 NMs/Min = 0.333 NM/sec
Find the time and range for intercept.
Solution: After 30 seconds, the current target position can be found from
Eq. 3-1
^L = ^Det - ( Tl X Vtgt )
where Tl = 30 sec
Thus, we have
Rl = 30 NMs - ( 30 sec x 0.167 NM/sec ) = 25 NMs
For intercept time, using Eq. 3-2 and Eq. 3-3
Tp,^ = Rl / ( WsAM + Vtgt ) = 25 NMs / ( 0.167 + 0.333 ) NM/sec = 50 sec
Tint = Tpiy -H Tl = 50 sec + 30 sec = 80 sec.
Therefore, from either Eq. 3-4 or Eq. 3-5 which gives the intercept range
Rin. = VsAM X Tp,^ = 0.333 NM/sec x 50 sec = 16.67 NMs.
or
K, = Rdc, - ( Ti„, X Vtgt ) = 30 Nms - ( 80 x 0.167 ) NMs
= 30 - 13.33 Nms = 16.67 NMs.
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After the incoming target is detected, the Identification-Friend-or-Foe
(IFl") systems wiJI identify the target, the surveillance radar data will link to the Fire
Control Radar (FCR), the personnel wiJl take proper action, SAM will be ready. The
time taken by the above actions is called reaction time. Two FCR are used in this
simulation and both have the same reaction time, however, they both control the same
missile launcher. When the first target is found, FCR 1 will be assigned against the
target and control a SAM. The second target will be assigned to FCR 2. The first
engaged target might not be destroyed by the first SAM firing. However, the FCR will
not shift to another target unless the previous target was destroyed and checking the
results requires additional FCR time (the assessment time). The FCRs have to check
each other after they have destroyed the first assigned target. Then, after the lapse of
a second reaction time, they will shift to the second priority target in order to achieve
the maximum performance of SAM defense. The above processing sequence has been
illustrated in Figure 111-2.
b. CrWS Sub-Module
This module becomes active when the incoming target arrives at the
CIWS defended area. After this, the program reads the present position of the
incoming target and continuously fires at it. This requires five seconds reaction time.
The process of CIWS defense is demonstrated in Figure 111-3.
The probability of kill varies with continuous firing time. The greater
the time the more bullets that can be fired at the engaged target, and hence the higher
the probability of kill. Therefore, the program will predict the continuous fu^ing time
and. as mention before, the maximum is 8 seconds. The kill probability is determined















Figure III-3 CIVJS Sub-Module
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(1). T^F between ( 0, 4 )
P, = 0.075 X Tcp (3-6)
(2). Tcp between ( 4, 6 )
P, = 0.1 X Tcp - 0.1 (3-7)
(3). Tcp between ( 6, 8 )
P, = 0.05 X Tcp + 0.2 (3-8)
where
TcF = Continuous firing time in second
P, = Probability of kUl
The program will determine the predicted intercept distance according
to the above process. If it is in excess of the minimum intercept range of CIWS, Then
CIWS will develop fire up to maximum continuous firing time. If not, it will keep
firing at the engaged target until it passes through the final defensive line. A uniform
random number is compared with the proper P^ value of CIWS to determine whether
the engaged target is destroyed or not.
2. Soft-Kill Systems Module
The defensive jammer and chaff are available in the soft-kill systems. In
order to search for, intercept, locate, and identify sources of enemy electromagnetic
radiation, the ESM receivers are used. They provide the information which is used for
the purpose of threat recognition and fnr the tactical employment of ECM equipment.
The process of employing an EW defense is illustrated in the diagram shown simplified
























Figure 1 1 1-4 EVJ Module
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There are three different modules in this program. Before going into the
three modules, two statements will help to understand the principle used in this section:
- To reduce the ASM kUl probability, deceptive jamming is often employed
against fire control and missUe guidance radars. A defensive jammer may be able to
degrade the accuracy of both angular and range information developed by the radar and
may, therefore, greatly reduce the kUl probability. In some cases, it may be able to
cause break-lock of the tracking radar, causing it to become completely unlocked from
the target. The radar must then reacquire its target and valuable time is lost, along
with a great deal of information about the target position. The technique used to
degrade the accuracy of the azimuth and elevation tracking circuits is a function of the
tracking technique used. Thus defensive jammers must be tailored to the characteristics
of the victim radar.
- Chaff can be manufactured to be effective over wide frequency ranges. It does
not depend on a priori knowledge or detailed information about victim weapon systems.
Also, when properly deployed, it is effective against many radars simultaneously.
a. Defensive jammer & Chaff Module
Detection of the main-beam radiation from a seeker on the incoming
target wUl be done by an ESM receiver. The defensive jammer and chaff will not
react until the order and information are delivered. The fimction of these systems is
to cause the seeker of the engaged target to break its lock on the ship being defended.
The roles of defensive jammer and chaff in naval operations are correspondingly
complex and a general discussion of the theory of employment of these systems is
beyond the scope of the present paper. However, this simulation program will
implement this module in accordance with the assumptions on weapons configuration
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which are adopted for the puq^oses of a parametric study. Therefore, after ESM
provides the necessary information, the EW systems automatically react and provide the
proper jamming method and appropriately deploy the chaff.
For example, suppose that the weapon systems have the same
characteristics as example 3.1. Using the same method as illustrated in example 3.1,
four impact points can be found in the SAM defense area. The launch time, launch
range, flying time, intercept time, and intercept range of SAM are shown in Table
in-2. TTiere is no fifth impact point because the intercept range falls below the
minimum intercept range of the SAM defense. If the engaged targets were not shot
down in the first three impact points, then the next action will shift to the fourth
impact point. In the meantime, it is assumed that the seeker of the engaged targets
turned on at 6 NMs. Once this action was detected, the defensive jammer made the
appropriate response. It required ten seconds reaction time, and jamming continues
throughout the remainder of the engagement.
TABLE ni-2 The Information of Each Impact Point for a Sample Event
Impact Point T,(sec) R,(NM) T„
,,
(sec) T.Jsec) RtJNM)
1 30 25 50 80 16.67
2 88 15.33 30.67 118.67 10.22
3 126.67 8.89 17.78 144.45 5.93
4 152.45 4.59 9.18 161.63 3.06
The chaff was also activated at 6 KM target range. It required ten
seconds reaction time from chaff assignment to launch and an additional ten seconds
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from launch to bloom. The cloud of chaff is <ible to stay in the sky about 45 seconds
at tiie effective area close to the warship. According to the velocity of the target, it
can fly 3.34 NMs during 20 seconds. This means that the range of the engaged target
will decrease from 6 NMs to 2.67 NM before the chaff blooms and generates defensive
effectiveness.
Two kinds of defensive modules (SAM + jamming) are active against
the engaged targets before the impact point 3, in accordance with the above example.
However, they do not interfere with each other operationally and there kills are not
double counted in the simulation. For instance, the intercept range is 5.93 NM for
impact point 3. If failure occurred, the next intercept range is 3.06 NM, which is the
last intercept point for SAM. If SAM could not shoot down the engaged target, then
the EW and CIWS will take over the defense action. Of course, a lot of different
situations will be generated in this simulation and they can be analyzed and compared
based on the process which is discussed above.
b. Defensive Jammer Sub-Module
For the defensive jammer, the reaction is as described above. The
following are illustrations of the various jamming techniques applied at present.
- The technique commonly employed for disrupting range tracking circuits is
called range-gate pull off (RGPO). The defensive jammer initially repeats the each
incoming pulse to capture the radar automatic gain-control (AGO circuitry, the time
delay is then gradually increased. Usually the RGPO cycle is repeated as long as the
radar represents a threat.
- The jamming technique applicable against the conical-scan tracker is called
inverse gain. The object is to produce, in the radar, error voltages in the vertical and
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horizontal channels respectively. Experience has shown that inverse gain jamming can
lesult in break-lock, and the loss of the target by the tracking radar.
- The countermeasure commonly employed against conical-scan on receive only
(COSRO) is swept audio. While it is possible to achieve break-lock by using swept
audio against COSRO tracking radars, the soft-kill probability is much less than for
inverse gain against conical-scan trackers. Moreover, since the jammer is only effective
for a fraction of the time, the tracking radar may reacquire the target after the track
is broken.
The objective of AGC jamming techniques is to deny target tracking
information to tracking radars which employ amplitude information and use AGC to
control the receiver gain. The technique can be effective against conical scan or track-
while-scan systems, either active or passive (COSRO, TWSRO). This technique goes
by various names including AGC deception, countdown, stripper, modulation stripper,
AGC capture, and duty-cycle jamming.
In ISSP, the effect of all of these types of jamming is simulated by the
use of a jamming "kill probability" (Pk^.„^^,) in estimating the number of ASM that
leak through to impact on the target ship.
c. Chaff Sub-Module
From the ship's viewpoint, chaff must be launched to an altitude of
several hundred feet by means of rockets or mortar shells. The lifetime of a chaff
cloud is limited by the length of time required for the chaff to fall to the sea level.
Isolated chaff blooms can serve as confusion targets and make it more difficult for the
seeker to identifv' the true warship because that identification can he difficult when
many radar targets are present. Based on this concept, the better way is to have the
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chaff launched and bloomed before the missile seeker is turned on. In order to provide
enough false targets interspersed with the real one to saturate the seeker attack, several
chaffs bundles have to be ejected in different directions. Several waves of chaff
launches may be required to maintain the false targets. The effect of the use of chaff
is simulated by a chaff "kUl probability" (PnehiiT))-
E. SAMPLE SIZE
The degree of plausibility of any point estimate from this simulation will be
specified by a confidence interval. We speak of a 95% confidence interval which
means there is a degree of confidence of 95% that the true population parameter lies
with the interval. If the confidence level is high and the interval is small this provides
a reasonably precise knowledge of the value of the parameter.
For a large sample size, the Central Limit Theorem implies that the sample mean
has approximately a normal distribution whatever the nature of the population
distribution. The general formula for the sample size N necessary to ensure an interval
of width 2e is obtained from the following:^
N = (Z^mi-P) / e^
where
N: Sample size
e: Accuracy criterion, assume to be 0.01.
P: Population proportion to be estimated, the ship survivability in this program
a: Significance level = 0.05 for confidence interval of 95%
X^i. Critical value = 1.96 for confidence interval of 95%
A choice of sample size N can be made by taking advantage of the fact that
P(l-P) is maximized for P = 1/2 and decreases as P moves away from 1/2 in either
direction. The most conservative approach is to use P = 1/2. for then the accuracy
criterion will be < e no matter what P is actually observed.
' Ref. 1, p. 19/ Ref. 12, p. 427; Ref. 13, p. 263
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For this program, let P denote the population proportion which is ship
survivability, and we calculate a 95% confidence interval of half width 0.01 for P,
based on this data. Therefore, the sample size N required to yield a 95% confidence
interval whose accuracy criterion is at most 0.01, whatever the resulting value of P, is
N = (Z^)'P(l-P) / e' = (1.96W.5)V(0.01)' =9604
It would be necessary to test 9604 iterations in order to fulfill the requirement.
TTie 10000 iterations has been selected in this program to ensure the accuracy is within
0.01.
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IV. THE ISSP PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS
A. THE IMPROVEMENT PLAN FOR AAW WEAPON SYSTEM
Ajiti-air Warfare (AAW) is a term for actions required to destroy, or reduce to
an acceptable level, the hostile air and missile threat. It includes such measures as the
use of airborne interceptors, bombers, high fire rate antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and
air-to-air missiles, and electronic countermeasures to destroy the air or missile threat
both before and after it is launched. Other measures taken to minimize the effects of
hostile air action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic)
and mobility.
A major problem, experienced in many countries, is how best to use a limited
budget to upgrade ship survivability. There are several approaches. One can improve
or enhance the capability of existing combat systems, or add new and more powerful
systems. The first approach includes increasing the loading speed of the launcher, the
probability of kill, the velocity, and the intercept range of the SAM; and decreasing the
system reaction time, the assessment speed and the data processing speed in the
computer. Several alternative plans for improving the existing SAM defense of a
warship are summarized in Table IV-l. The four plans call for increasing SAM kill
probability and reducing reaction time with and without the addition of defensive
jammer (ECM) and chaff.
The following wOl discuss the first two cases which is the hard-kill defense by
active systems (SAM & CIWS) and integration of the soft-kill defense will be
introduced in the next sections.
Improving the P^ value of the SAM is an obvious way to enhance the
survivability of the warship. This is illustrated for the defense against a simultaneous
attack by four anti-ship missiles. Tlie expected number of leaking missiles through
to the ship for different detection ranges and different Pi,s is shown in Figure IV-l (a).
For example, at detection range 20 Nm. the expected value of leaking missiles is 2.24
for P,, equals 0.3, the mean value of expected leaking missile is l.?7 for P,, equals 0.7,
the difference is 0.87 or ahonf 22^. In Figure TV-2 shows the perfonnance of the
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hard-kill system, in terms of missiles destroyed. At detection range 20 Nm, the
expected number of the anti-ship missiles destroyed by the SAM is 1 .09 for P,, equals
0.3, and 1.96 for P"" equals 0.7, the difference is 0.90. This means about one more
anti-ship missile can be destroyed in term of increasing P^ value of SAM. The ship
survivability is illustrated in Figure IV-3(a). TTiis figure shows that higher P^ and
longer detection range both yield higher ship survivability.
TABLE IV- 1 The Modified Plan for AAW Performance
CASE PK(SAM) PK(ECM) PK(CHAFF) REACTION TIME EW
1 0.3 0.0 0.0 30 NO
2 0.7 0.0 0.0 20 NO
3 0.3 0.3 0.4 30 YES
4 0.7 05 06 20 YES
The other way which has been chosen for improving the effectiveness is to
reduce the reaction time. Figure rV-l(b) shows for a 20 second reaction time, the
expected number of leaking missiles and the reduction in missile leakage is shown in
Figure rV-4(a). Although there is some fluctuation, the expected leaking missiles have
been reduced at each detection range and different P^. For the hard-kill systems.
Figure IV-5 summarizes the results for reaction time equal 20 seconds. Comparing this
figure with Figure IV-2, Illustrates the importance of reaction time at both short and
long detection ranges, especially at higher P^ values. Figure IV-3(b) shows the ship
survivability at different Pj^ for reaction time equal to 20 seconds. The differences
due to different reaction times at different detection range and different P^ are
demonstrated in Figure IV-4(b).
Clearly, the higher P^ and <^horter reaction tijne can improve the performance of
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Figure IV-1 E::pected leaking missiles
























Figure IV-2 Performance of hard-kill systems
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Figure IV-3 Ship survivability vs. detection range (a)


























Figure IV-4 (a) Decrement of expected leaking misssiles
detection range (from RT=30 to RT=20) (b) Increment of






























Figure IV-5 Performance of hard-kill systems vs.
detection range SAM RT=20: (a) SAM P,-0 . 3 (b) SAM P,0 . 5










Figure IV-6 The .pie-chart or the performance at different
detection range SAI-I RT=20 P.,= . 7 .
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pie-chart of the performance at different detection ranges for reaction time equal to
20 seconds and kill probability equal to 0.7.
B. INTEC.RATED PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTIVE AND EW SYSTEM
From the point of view of a total defense, one must consider not only the hard-
kill system but also the soft -kill system. Once the soft-kill system is purchased and
installed with the hard-kill system, then the anti-ship missiles would have to engage
three defensive layers which provide a better survivability. The point for doing this
is because "Offense is the best defense"; the more aggressive defensive system could
give more efficient protection.
In this section the EW system will be considered in three categories: ECM, Chaff
and ECM & Chaff. The best and normal category is the combination of ECM and
chaff. From a tactical point of view, the better the integration (ECM and Chaff) the
better the result. In case we have to use chaff or ECM only, we are interested to
know how much we can gain from each system. This could aid in supporting the
decision to add the EW systems. The following will demonstrate how these three
categories effect the defense effectiveness.
There are four conditions which are specified in Table IV-2 that will help us to
track the categories. First of all, the base EW system (Pk(j.n,ming)=03, Pk,ch.fr)=0-4) is
added to the base active system which is condition 3. In this case. Figure IV-7(a)
shows the survivability of each condition and the difference is shown in Figure TV-
8(a). For instance, condition 1 could increase survivability 9%, condition 2 could














10 15 20 25
Detection Range
30
Figure IV-7 Ship survivability VS detection range (SAM
RT=30 P,=0.3): (a) ECM P,=0.3;Chaff P,=0.4 (b) ECM
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Figure IV-8 The increment of ship survivability
corresponding to Fig. IV-7.
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TABLE TV-2 Weapon Systems Corresponding to Conditions
Condition SAM CIWS ECM ChaffXX
1 XXX
2 X X X
_3 2^ 2^ 2^ X
So far, the result is the kind of reasonable thing which one can predict. The key
at this stage is whether this is good enough or whether there is another way which
could further increase the survivability. As far as survivability is concerned, it is still
not high enough at this stage. In order to achieve the desired results, further action
will be required.
1. Improving ECM P^ value from 0.3 to 0.5
The characteristics of the ECM have been mentioned in chapter two. The
P^ contains such factors as personnel, operation, maintenance and data upgrade, as well
as system reliability. Thus, an ECM system, which when new might have an effective
P^ of 0.5, may now have a current P,, of 0.3.
When the P^ of ECM is improved to 0.5, the survivability is illustrated in
Figure rV-7(b) and the difference is shown in Figure rV-8(b). At detection range 25
Nm, condition 1 has 1% improvement and condition 3 has 4% improvement. As a
result, the higher the P^. the higher the survivability. The number of expected leaking
missiles decreases at each detection range as is demonstrated in Figure rV-9(a)&(b) and
Figure IV -10(a)&(b). Condition 1 has 5% decrement and condition 3 has 3%





















Figure IV-9 Expected leaking missiles vs. detection range
at various conditions 'SAI^ RT=30; P,=0.3): (a) ECM P,=0 .
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Figure IV-10 Decrement cf e::pected leaking missiles
corresponding to Fig. IV-9.
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2. Improving Chaff P^ value from 0.4 to 0.6
After the improvement of ECM, the deserved performance of the system and
the survivability of the warship still can not be satisfied. Therefore, the process of
improving the chaff's P,, value has to be continued at this stage.
When chaff's P^ value is upgraded to 0.6, the performance of the soft-kill
system is more remarkable than before. As demonstrated in Figure rV-9(b)&(d) and
Figure rV-10(b)&(d), the number of expected leaking missiles is reduced from 1.43 to
1.24 for condition 2 and from 1.1 5.to 1.06 for condition 3 at detection range 25 Nm.
The degree of decrement in expected leaking missiles is 5% for condition 2 and 2.3%
for condition 3. As shown in Figure IV-7(b)&(d) and Figure rV-8(b)&(d), the value
of ship survivability is increased from 0.21 to 0.28 for condition 2 and from 0.31 to
0.34 for condition 3 at detection range 25 Nm. The degree of increment in
survivability is 7% for condition 2 and 3% for condition 3.
So far, we have done case 3 and a part of case 4, as described in Table-
IV-1, in which P, values are 0.3 for SAM, 0.3 to 0.5 for ECM, 0.4 to 0.6 for Chaff,
and reaction time is 30 seconds. In order to complete the improvement plan, the P^
value of SAM has to be upgraded 0.7 and the reaction time has to be reduced to 20
seconds. Then, the result of increasing the P^ values of ECM and Chaff must be
estimated again.
Figure TV- 11 shows the ship survivabilities corresponding to the different
defense configurations and the comparisons are demonstrated in Figure IV- 12. For
example, when the P^^ values are 0.7 for SAM. 0.5 for ECM, and 0.4 for Chaff, and
the reaction time is 20 second*?, the ship sur\'ivabilities are 16 for condition 0. 0.41




















IV-11 Ship survivability vs. detection range at
s conditions (SAM RT=20; P,=0 . 7 ) : (a) ECM P,=0.3/Chaff



























Figure IV-12 Increment of ship survivability at various
conditions correspondina to Fia. IV-11.
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Nm. The improvement percentages, when compare with condition 0, are 25 % for
Condition 1, 20 % for condition 2, and 35 % for condition 3 at the same detection
range. All these things are illustrated in Figure IV-ll(b) and Figure Iv-12(b)
individual.
There are six options, created from the above discussions. These are shown
in Table rV-3. The P^sam) value is 0.3 and reaction time is 30 for option 1, 2, &3;
the P^ value is 0.7 and reaction time is 20 for option 4, 5, &6. The P^CECM) value
is 0.3 and P,(Chaff) value is 0.4 for base EW; the P,(ECM) value is 0.5 and P,(Chaff)
is 0.6 for improved EW. The ship survivability at different options and different
detection ranges are summarized in Figure rV-13, and the comparisons corresponding
to the various decisions are exhibited in Figure rV-14. These provide further
information helping the decision maker to find the trade-off between systems costs and
measures of effectiveness.
TABLE rV-3 Weapon Systems Corresponding to Decisions







Of course, there are some other factors that will bear on the decision to
unplement a particular option. These includes system reliability, maintainability,
storage space, balance of the warship, capability of support, and training requirements.
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Figure IV-14 Increment of ship survivability
corresponding to Fig. IV-13.
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C. UNDER .lAMMTNC rONDITIONS
A more complete description of the enemy threat to target ship survivability
would include enemy jamming of the ship's defensive systems. The jamming threat
can be estimated in several ways, ranging from using intelligence on an enemy's
present capabilities and design practices to an assessment of technological trends in this
threat. The latter method estimates the theoretical characteristics possible for the kind
of threat systems under evaluation. Examples of the above described threat estimation
methods in this section are constrained by the fact that much of the detailed
information on enemy threats is by nature classified. However, an assumption is
available in the unclassified literature and will be used to illustrate the various threat
estimation approaches. The reader is cautioned that the use of such assumption is for
parametric study purposes only, and does not imply the authenticity of the assumption
utilized.
In general, the countermeasures used against the defensive systems wUl be
directed against the detection and missUe guidance systems. In the design of radars,
it is a complex project to counter ECM, and depends on the sort of ECM involved and
the mission of the special radar under consideration. From the viewpoint of an ECM-
ECCM duel, any radar can be jammed and any ECM can be countered depending on
those resources which either side is willing to commit. From the enemy point of view,
three possible actions could be taken against radar, such as using radiation energy to
confuse the radar, injecting spurious targets into the radar's surveillance volume, and
destruction of the radar. The first two are kinds of soft-kill and the last is referred to




- Decoys and expendables
- Anti-radiation missiles.
'Ref. 6, p. 109
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The range at which the defending radar can detect an attacking ASM is a
fundamental attribute of either a search or tracking radar. It is obvious that this
depends on the parameters of the radar and the reflection characteristics of the target,
such as average transmitter power, effective antenna aperture, average target radar cross
section, etc. Nevertheless, a basic limitation is that the target usually has to be
detected against an interference background which includes at least the ever-present
receiver thermal noise. Since it is a random process, the noise has to be specified in
terms of its statistical properties. As a result, radar detection has to be described in
a statistical manner in order to be meaningful, using such parameters as threshold
signal strength, probability of detection, and probability of false alarm. Estimates of
the detection performance of a practical radar in a noise background can be calculated
from the Marcum-Swerling theory but this is beyond the scope of this study. In fact,
good detection performance in both clear and ECM environments requires a balance
betweenaverage transmitter power and antenna aperture. The rest of this section will
focus on the analysis of the simulation results and the estimations of the various threat
environments.
But technical complexities and classification problems aside, the major impact of
countermeasures is to reduce the detection range. The fact that this significantly
increases the severity of the threat is illustrated in Figure FV- 15(a) which shows that,
for a hard-kill defense, when detection range is 17 Nm, about 49 % of the ASM could
be destroyed by SAM, 17 % could be destroyed by CIWS, and 34 % would be leaking
through the defense. If detection range is cut to 7 Nm, the SAM is unable to destroy
the target because the interception range is within the 3 Nm from the warship. In this
case, the defense can only be done by CIWS. The number of anti-ship missiles
leaking through the defense at different detection ranges and different SAMs P^ value
are demonstrated in Figure IV- 16. Figure IV- 17 illustrates the ship survivability under
the same conditions.
The summar>' from the above discussion is thnt the SAM defense is vulnerable
to EW, although CIWS could improve the close-in defense. But, from the overall
defense viewpoint, the ship sur\'ivability is not sufficient for real war. However an
EW system introduced into the defense tend«; overcome thi^; vulnerability. Figure IV-





















Figure IV-15 The performance of hard-kill system at
different detection range (SAI-l P.T=2 0/ P.. = . 7 ) : (a) 17 NMs
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Figure IV-17 Ship survivability
RT=2 0)
.


















Figure IV-18 Performance of condition 1 & 2 (SAI-I
RT=30/P,=0.3) : (a) ECM P,=0 . 3 (b) Chaff P, = 0.4 (c) ECM




3 is demonstrated in Figure IV- 19. Figures IV- 19(a) to (c) illustrate the range from
base HW system performance to improved HW system perfomiance. Tn a sense, the
performance at higher P^ value provides more effectiveness than others. The ship
survivabilities from base EW system to improved EW system are summarized in Figure
IV-20. For instance, the survivabilities are 0.07 for condition 0, 0.22 for condition 1,
0.27 for condition 2, and 0.36 for condition 3 at detection range equals 17 Nm, as
shown in Figure rV-20(a). The degrees of increment of the shipsurvivabilities at
various conditions are illustrated in Figure IV-21. Figure rV-21(a) shows that condition
1 could increase survivability 15%, condition 2 could increase survivability 20%, and
condition 3 could increase survivability 29% at the same detection range.
The ship survivabilities for various options and different detection ranges are
exhibited in Figure IV-13, and the comparisons corresponding to the different decisions
are illustrated in Figure rV-14. These data provide the information which under
jamming condition. For instance, at detection range 15 NMs, decision 5 has increment
about 24 % compare to decision 1 and 2, decision 6 has 32 % increment at the same
condition, the difference between these two is 8 %. It is very useful and helpful for
making the decision on the final modification plan.
D. SERIAL ASM THREAT CONSIDERATION
The sequential threat will be illustrated in this section. The ASM were launched
following one after another in an orderly pattem. The AAW operation was shown in
Figure IV-22. The four lines represent the different flight routes of the engaged ASM.
The starting points of these lines represent the time and range at which the warship
detects each attacking ASM. The ends of these lines represent the times of ASM
impact on the warship. The intercept points are different from those which are
illustrated in Example 3.1 and Table 111-2 due to the fact that the spacing is different.
Figure rV-22-(a) shows the SAM can exactly hit the engaged ASM and destroy it.
Figure TV-22-(b) illustrates one SA^T missing the engaged ASM. Of course, this
simulation program can generate more complicated situations and provide the response
results. In addition, it also include the EW and CFW^S defensive scenario.
The survivability of the war<?hip versus different sequential threats was
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Figure IV-21 The increment of ship survivability
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Figure IV-22 The AAW operarion corresponding to serial
ASM threat (a) SAM e::actely hit the engaged ASM (b) one





























Figure IV-23 The ship sur"ivabilit;
sequential attacking ASMs
.
vs . three different
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be zero, five, and ten respectively. Tlie detection range is 30 NMs for this example,
the reaction time of SAM is 20 seconds, and the P^ values are 0.7. 0.3. and 0.4 for




A computer program simulatingan anti-airwarfare operation conducted by the
various weapon systems of a warship was written in the TURBO BASIC language
to run on a PC-DOS personal computer. This program simulates the integrated
performance of hard-kill and soft-kill systems against a four anti-ship missile attack,
predicts the expected number and percentage of anti-ship missiles destroyed by
various weapon modules, and the corresponding ship survivabilities. In addition, it
provides the analysis and comparison of the results which came from the different
Pk values and the various weapon modules.
Two major AAW improvement plans were considered in this study. One is
focused on the h>rd-killweapon systems, the other is focused on the soft-kill weapon
systems. The ship survivabilitywas estimated with the various improvement plans.
Based on these plans, six options of decision were created. The increased ship
sunivabilityand the improvements in ASM kills were assessed for each option in a
way that would support the making of choices between them. This would be a
significant contribution to the resource allocation questions typically faced in
selecting a suite of air defense weaponry for a modern warship.
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APPENDIX A
Assumptions of the ISSP
* Four low altitude incoming targets.
* The target spacing is 0, 5, 10.
* The radar detection ranges are 30, 25, 20, 15, lONMs, and the ranges are 17, 12,
7 in jamming condition.
* The reaction time from target detection to SAM launch is assumed to be 20 and
30 seconds.
* The maximum and minimum intercept range of SAM is 30 and 3 NMs,
respectively.
* The kill probabilities of a single SAM are assumed to be 0.3, 0.5, 0.7.
* The engagement doctrine is shoot-look-shoot and the SAM is home-all-the-way.
* The SAM launch cycle time is 5 seconds and the assessment time which
determines whether the target is destroyed or not is 8 seconds.
* The velocity is 20 NMs/Min for SAM, and 10 NMs/Min for the target.
* The range of target seeker turn on is assumed to be 6 NMs.
* The reaction time of defensive jammer (ECM) is 15 seconds.
* The reaction time from chaff assigned to launch is assumed to be 10 seconds.
* The reaction time from chaff launched to bloom is assumed to be 10 seconds.
* The chaff cloud is able to stay in the sky about 45 seconds.
* The minimum intercept range for CIWS is assumed to be 0.1 NMs, and the
maximum intercept range is 2 NMs.
* The reaction time of CIWS is assumed to be 5 seconds, and the assessment time
is 2 seconds.
* The fire rate of CIWS is assumed to be 30 rounds per second, and the total
ammunition is 1200 rounds.





' 5< Interactive Simulation of The Integrated Hard-kill and Soft-kill Weapon K
•X Systems Performance (ISSP) *
»X X
'XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
•xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx VARIABLE DECLARATIONS xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
•SHIP IS 'HIT' WHEN ANY TGT OVER THE CRITICAL TIME WITHOUT BEING KILLED
'SI: VELOCITY OF SAM
•S2: VELOCITY OF TGT
'LEAKING.TGTS GOT THROUGH THE SHIP'S DEFINSE.




'MODE: TYPE OF MODE
'MARKi=l, ONE OF THE TWO MISSILES IS NOT ABLE TO INTERCEPTED.





•xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx INPUT SIMULATION PARAMETER xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
INPUT "SEED =";SEED
PRINT"SEED=";SEED
PRINT "INPUT SAMPLE SIZE"
INPUT "SZG=";SZG
PRINT "INPUT SPACING TIME"
INPUT "SPG=";SPG




PRINT "0 : NO JAMMING"
PRINT "1 : UNDER JAMMING"
INPUT "ENFT =";ENFT
IF ENFT = THEN
LPRINT "NO JAMMING CONDITION"
RAEG = 30 I ERAE = 10
ELSE
LPRINT "UNDER JAMMING CONDITION"
PRINT "ENTER DETECTION RANGE (NM)"
INPUT "RAEG =";RAEG : ERAE = RAEG - 10
END IF








COMBINE CHAFF 8 ECM"
INPUT "MODE =";MODE
PRINT "MODE =";MODE
IF MODE = THEN
LPRINT"THIS TRIAL RUN IS BASE ON THE ACTIVE SYSTEM ONLY, NO EW SYSTEM INV
OLVED"
ELSEIF MODE = 1 THEN
LPRINT"THIS TRIAL RUN IS BASE ON THE ACTIVE SYSTEM S ECM ONLY"
PRINT "INPUT ECM PK :" : INPUT "ECMPK="; ECMPK
ELSEIF MODE = 2 THEN
LPRINT"THIS TRIAL RUN IS BASE ON THE ACTIVE SYSTEM 8 CHAFF ONLY"
PRINT "INPUT CHAFF PK : " t INPUT "CAFPK="; CAFPK
ELSE
LPRINT"THIS TRIAL RUN IS BASE ON THE COMBINED ACTIVE 8 EW SYSTEM"
PRINT "INPUT ECM PK :" : INPUT "ECMPK=" ; ECMPK
PRINT "INPUT CHAFF PK :" : INPUT "CAFPK="; CAFPK
COMPK = 1 - (l-ECMPK)X(l-CAFPK)
END IF
'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx MAIN PROGRAM xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sl=l/3 ' SI: speed of SAM
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S2=l/6 • S2: speed of TGT
c 7 - c 7 p
LPRIMT"SAMPLE SIZE =";SZ • SZisample size
SPACIt)G = SPG ' THE SPACING TIME BETHEEH THE TGTs
LPRIMT "SPACING TiriE = "; SPACING
LPRINT " "
SEQ=SPACING ' SAME AS SPACING FOR SUBSTITUTION.
CIWSRT=5 'CINS REACTION TIME IS 5 SEC.
MI=2 'MI IS THE MAXIMUM INTERCEPT RANGE OF THE CIWS
PRINT "THIS PROGRAM IS RUNNING , PLEASE DO NOT TURN THESE MACHINES OFF.
PRINT " " : PRINT " "
I=0:PK=.70



























xx)f SAM MODULE xxxxx)(xxxxxxxx
EN GOTO 220
20 THEN GOTO 200
=0:RM(I,J)=RT
RANGE=RAEG
NGE<ERAE THEN GOTO 180



































GOTO 160 'N IS SAMPLE SIZE
0!M=0:L = 0tMARK = 0:OK = '4:TGTlSUC = 0tTGT2SUC = 0tAR=0
•RL IS RELOAD NUMBER
E 'TT IS TOTAL TIME
GE-3) 'TC IS CRITICAL TIME

















EN SUCCESS=SUCCESS+1 : NOL EAK=N0LEAK+1
TGTKILLED+TGTK
AND MODE=0 THEN GOTO 1^0
•xxxxxxxxxxxxx ECM MODULE xx?fxxxxxxxxxxx3(xxxxxxx
IF FLAG^l AfID M0DE = 1 THEN
GOSUB ECM
IF (OKC-ARC) = THEN FLAG=0
GOTO I'iO
END IF
» xxxxxxxxxxxxx CHAFF MODULE )(?(Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
IF FLAG=1 AND M0DE=2 THEN
GOSUB CHAFF




•xxxxxxxxxxxxx COMBINED ECM $ CHAFF MODULE
IF FLAG=1 AUD M0DE=3 THEN
GOSUB COMB





















IF OK > THEN HIT =HIT+1






















THE f OF THE SAM FIRED."
THE EXPECTED « OF THE SAM FIRED."
THE t OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE SHIP IN SAM MODE."
EXPECTED VALUE OF V, WHICH IS THE SURVIVALBI L ITY OF THE "
SHIP IN SAM MODE."
THE f OF THE TGTS ARE DISTROYED BY SAM."
EXPECTED « OF THE TGTS ARE DESTROYED BY SAM. "







































































































TGTS LEAKING THROUGHT THE SAM DEFENSE."
LUE OF THE LEAKING TGTS."
LLED BY CIWS"
OF THE TGTs DESTROYED BY SAM AND CIWS +/- EW.
» OF TGTS HIT THE SHIP SUCCESSFULLY"
LBILITY."
PK, CHAFF PK, ECMSCHAFF PK
« OF DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM"
# OF DESTROYED TGTS BY CHAFF"
# OF DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM & CHAFF"
DESTROYED TGTS BY SAM"
DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM"
DESTROYED TGTS BY CHAFF"
DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM 8 CHAFF"
DESTROYED TGTS BY CIWS"
E(V) BINGO EK HIT LEAK E(L) EK EK PENET-




A$= "ff« t» 8«#«» S.St «##» i.tS «t«St S.St t.tt ttStS t.St t.tS S.tt *.9*
St"
B$= "PK0= t.S PK1= t.S PK2= S.S PK3= S.S"
C$= "St tt t.tt t.tt t.St S.tt S.tt t.tt t.St S.tt"
FOR 1=1 TO 3




FOR J=l TO 2
FOR K=l TO 5
AA=RM(I,J) 'REACTION TIME
BB=RA(K) 'RANGE
CC=TM(I,J,K) 'TOTAL SAM THE SHIP HAS FIRED
DD=NS(I,J,K) 'EXPECTED « OF THE SAM HAVE BEEN FIRED
EE=SA(I,J,K) 'THE « OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE SHIP IN SAM MODE
FF=ESA(I,J,K) 'THE EXPECTED « OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE SHIP IN SAM
GG=BG(I,J,K) 'THE « OF THE DESTROYED TGTs BY SAM
HH=EK(I,J,K) 'THE EXPECTED t OF THE DESTROYED TGTs BY SAM
LL=DEFFAIL(I, J,K)/N 'EXPECTED « OF AT LEAST ONE TGTs IMPACT THE SHIP
MM=LEAKTHRU(I, J,K) 'THE * OF THE TGTs GET THRU THE SAM'S DEFENSE
NN=ESI(I,J,K) 'THE EXPECTED t OF THE TGTs GET THRU THE SAM's
' DEFENSE
00=ECK(I, J,K) 'THE t OF THE TGTs ARE KILLED BY THE CIWS
PP=TOTALEK(I, J,K) 'THE FINAL EK (TGTs ARE DEFENDED BY SAM AND CINS +/
- EN)
OQ=(MM-GOODMIX(I,J,K))/N 'THE TGTs IMPACT THE SHIP SUCCESSFULLY
RR=SS(I,J,K) 'THE SHIP's SURVIVALBI LITY
•SA(I,J,K): SUCCESS. ESKI, J,K) :EXPECT « TGT GETTING THRU.




LPRINT" " : LPRINT" " : LPRINT" n
LPRirJT"RT RANGE EK EK EK '/. '/. '/. '/. '/. "
LPRINT" ECM CHAFF COMB BG ECM CHAFF COMB CIWS"
LPRINT" It
FOR 1=1 TO 3
LPRINT USING B$ ; QQ( I) , ECMPK, CAFPK, COMPK
FOR J=l TO 2
FOR K=l TO 5
AA=RM(I,J) 'REACTION TIME
BB=RA(K) 'RANGE
BECME=BYECM(I, J,K)/N 'THE EXPECTED « OF DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM
BCAFE=BYCHAFF(I, J,K)/N 'THE EXPECTED t OF DESTROYED TGTS BY CHAFF
BCOMB=BYCOMB(I, J,K)/N 'THE EXPECTED « OF DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM & CH
AFF
BGP = BG(I, J,K)/('i5(N) 'THE '/. OF THE DESTROYED TGTS BY SAM
ECMP = BYECM(I, J,K)/(^*N) 'THE '/. OF THE DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM
CAFP = BYCHAFF(I, J,K)/('4XN)'THE •/. OF THE DESTROYED TGTS BY CHAFF
COMP = BYCOMB(I, J,K)/(^xfn 'THE '/. OF THE DESTROYED TGTS BY ECM S CHAFF
CIHP = BYCIWS(I, J,K)/(^)(N) 'THE /. OF THE DESTROYED TGTS BY CINS








IF NFR0M = 125^ AND NHERE = 123'i THEN
IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1
GOTO 2^0
END IF
IF NFR0M = 123<i AND WHERE = 3^ THEN
' TP=T-^ THE EXACT TIME FOLLOWING TGT3 FOR SPACING ^ SEC HHEN FCRl
'FIRES SAM AT TGT3. SAM START RELOADING RIGHT AFTER THIS
'INCIDENT AT TP.
IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1 ELSE TP=TP+0
GOTO 2'^0
END IF
IF NFR0M = 23'^ AND WHERE = 3^ THEN
IF TP-T>1 THEN TP = TP + : T = T +
GOTO 2^0
END IF
IF NFR0M=13<4 AND HHERE = 5^ THEN




IF MFR0M = 23'^ AND (NHERE = 2<i OR WHERE = 4) THEN GOTO 2^0
IF MFR0M = 3^ AND (WHERE = 3 OR IIHERE = ^) THEN GOTO 2^0
IF NFR0M=3'4 AND NFR0ri = 34 THEN
IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1
GOTO 2A0
END IF
IF NFR0M=I3^ AND (IIHERE = 1<4 OR HHERE = ^) THEN GOTO 240
IF NFR0M = 23'i AtJD WHERE = 23'4 THEN GOTO 2-^0




270 'FIRST BLOCK IS ENGAGING THE 1ST TGT








370 IF DTGT <= 3 AND DTGTP <= 3 THEN
380 FLAG=1 :NSAM1=NSAM1-1 : NSAM2=NSAM2-1 :RETURN
390 END IF
400 IF DTGT <= 3 AND DTGTP > 3 THEN NSAMl =NSAM1-1 : TGT1SUC=1













T = T+8 : DTGT = RANGE-( T/6 )
TP = TP+8: DTGTP = RANGE- (TP/6)
CIHSDTGT = DTGT: CI WSDTGTP= DTGTP
CIHST=T:CIWSTP=TP 'CIWST AND CIHSTP ARE THE CIWS MODE
IF DTGT <= 3 AND DTGTP <= 3 THEN FLAG=1:G0T0 520
IF TGT1SUC=1 AND DTGTP <= 3
IF TGT2SUC=1 AND DTGT <= 3
IF Rl =< PK THEN TGTA=0
IF R2 =< PK THEN TGTB=0






T=T+8 : DTGT =RANGE-( T/6) t CIWST=T !CIWSDTGT=DTGT
IF R =< PK THEN TGT=0
IF DTGT <= 3 THEN FLAG=1
540
550 RETURfJ
560 'S1234: FCRl ON TGTl, FCR2 ON TGT2. NEED REACTION TIME.
FLAG=0 'IF FLAG=1 THEN SAM'S DEFENSE IS EfJDED
CIHSFLAG = 'IF CINSFLAG^l THEN CIIIS MODE IS ON, IJHICH IMPLY THERE
'ARE TGTs LEAKING THRU THE SAM's DEFENSE
MARK=0
NFR0M = 123^^ :KUM = 'KUM IS THE CODE FOR 1234-134-34-3 USE ONLY










r)SAMl = TGTlSAM:HSAM2 = TGT2SAM
GOSUB 260;TGTlSAM = rJSAMl :TGT2SAM = NSAr'12:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK = 1:G0SUB 530 : TGTl =TGT ; GOSUB l<i80:RETURN
END IF
GOSUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT1=TGTA:TGT2=TGTB
IF TGT1 = 1 Af^D TGT2 = 1 THEN GOTO 570
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT2=0 THEN GOSUB 590
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT2=1 THEN GOSUB 610
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT2=0 THEN GOSUB 650
580 RETURN
590 »S3^: 'SUBROUTINE FOR TGTl AND TGT2 HAVE BEEN KILLED BUT NOT TGT3 AND TGT^






ELSEIF NFR0M = 23'^ THEN
TP= TP-25^5PACING





IF NFR0M=123'4 THEN T = T + RT : TP = TP + RT : GOSUB 230
IF NFR0M=23^ THEN TP=TP+RT : GOSUB 230





GOSUB 260:TGT3SAM=NSAM1:TGT^SAM=NSAM2:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=l!GOSUB 530 = TGT3=TGT : GOSUB 1270. RETURN
END IF
GOSUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 AND TGT1SUC=0 THEN TGT3=TGTA : GOSUB 1270:RETURN
IF TGT1SUC = 1 AND TGT2SUC = THEN TGT'4 = TGTB : GOSUB 1170!RETURN
TGT3=TGTA:TGT^=TGTB
IF TGT3=1 AND TGT^=1 THEN GOSUB 230iGOTO 600
IF TGT3 = AND TGT'^ = THEN RETURN
IF TGT3 = AfJD TGT^ = THEN RETURN
IF TGT3 = AND TGT'i = l THEN GOSUB 1170
IF TGT3 = 1 AND TGT'4 = THEN GOSUB 1270
RETURN
610 •S23'4:
620 'SUBROUTINE FOR TGTl HAS BEEN KILLED BUT NOT TGT2,TGT3 AND TGT4
FLAG=0:WHERE=23^










GOSUB 260:TGT2SAM=NSAM1:TGT3SAM=NSAM2! IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
NFR0M=23^
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=1:G0SUB 530 : TGT2=TGT : GOSUB 13^0:RETURN
END IF
GOSUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
75
TGT2=TGTA:TGT3=TGTB
IF TGT2=1 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 630
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 1170
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOSUB 590
IF TGT2=1 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 790
6^0 RETURN
650 'S13^:
•SUBROUTINE FOR TGT2 HAS BEEN KILLED BUT NOT TGTl, AND TGT3,TGT<4 ARE
'STILL EXISTING
FLAG=0: HHERE=13^:KUM=1
'FCR1:TGT1-TGT1. FCR2 : TGT2-TGT3
.








670 GOSUB 260:TGT1SAM=NSAM1 !TGT3SAM=NSAM2:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
680 IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
690 MARK=1:G0SUB 530 : TGTl =TGT : GOSUB 1170:RETURN
700 END IF
710 NFR0M=13'^:G0SUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
720 TGT1=TGTA:TGT3=TGTB
730 IF TGT1=1 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 660
740 IF TGT1=0 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 1170
750 IF TGT1=0 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOSUB 590
760 IF TGT1=1 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 980
770 RETURN
780 •S2'^:
790 •TGT2 AND TGT<i LEFT, BUT FCRl SHIFTS FROM TGT3 TO TGT4, SO FCRl NEEDS THE
800 'REACTION TIME TO LOCK ON TGT^.
820 FLAG = 0:;')HERE = 2'^
'FCRl :TGT1-TGT3-TGT4. FCR2:TGT2









860 GOSUB 260:TGT2SAM=NSAM1 :TGT4SAM=NSAM2:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
870 IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
880 MARK=1:G0SUB 530 : TGTl =TGT : GOSUB 1340:RETURN
890 END IF
900 GOSUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
910 TGT2=TGTA:TGTA=TGTB
920 IF TGT2=1 AND TGT4=1 THEN GOTO 830
930 IF TGT2 = 1 AND TGT4 = THEt) GOSUB 1340
940 IF TGT2 = AND TGT4 = 1 THEt) GOSUB 1170
950 IF TGT2=0 AND TGT4=0 THEN RETURN
960 IF TGT2=0 AND TGT4=0 THEN RETURN
970 RETURN
980 '514: 'FCR2 KILLED TGT2 AND TGT3 ,AND NON SHIFTS TO TGT4, WHICH NEED
990 'REACTION TIME.
1010 FLAG=0: HHERE=14:
•FCRl : TGTl -TGTl -TGTl. FCR2 : TGT2-TGT3-TG4
.







103 NSAMl=TGTlSAM:fJSAM2 = TGT4SAM
1040 GOSUB 260:TGT15AM=NSAM1 :TGT4SAM=NSAM2:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
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1050 IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
1060 MARK = 1:G0SUB 530 = TGTl =TGT :GOSUB l<i80:RETURN
1070 ErJD IF
1080 MFR0M = 1'4:G0SUB 510: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
1090 TGT1=TGTA
1100 TGT2=TGTB
1110 IF TGT1 = 1 AtJD TGT'^ = 1 THEN GOTO 1020
1120 IF TGT1=1 AND TGT^ = THEN GOSUB I'^SO
1130 IF TGT1=0 AND TGT-^^l THEN GOSUB 1170
11^0 IF TGT1 = AND TGT'4 = THEN RETURN
1150 IF TGT1=0 AND TGT^=0 THEN RETURN
1160 RETURN
1170 'S^: 'HHEN TGT1,TGT2 AfJD TGT3 HAVE BEEN KILLED, THERE IS ONLY TGT'i LEFT
FLAG=0: WHERE = 4: 'PRINT "IN <^"
IF NFR0M = 3'^ THEN T = TP: GOTO 1180
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
1180 IF NFR0M=23^ THEN T=T-2XSPACING+RT
IF NFR0M=13'i THEN T = T-3xSPACING+RT
1190 TGT'hSAM = TGT'hSAM+1
rJSAMl^TGT'iSAM
GOSUB '^^0:TGT^SAM = NSAM1 :IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
1200 NFROM=^:GOSUB 530:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
1210 TGT<i = TGT: IF MARK = 1 THEN RETURN
1220 IF TGT'^ = THEN RETURN
1230 IF TGT<4 = 1 THEN GOTO 1190
12'^0
1250 RETURN
1270 ' S3: 'HHEN ALL THE OTHER THREE TGTS WERE KILLED, TGT3 LEFT
FLAG=0 :WHERE=3
IF KUM = 1 AtJD NFR0M = 34 THEN : T = TP :GOTO 1280
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
1280 TGT3SAM=TGT3SAM+1
NSAM1=TGT3SAM
GOSUB ^^0:TGT3SAM=NSAM1 ! IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
129C fiFR0M=3:G0SUB 530:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
1300 TGT3=TGT:IF MARK=1 THEN RETURN
1310 IF TGT3=0 THEN RETURN
1320 IF TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 1280
1330 RETURN
13A0 'S2: 'TGT2 LEFT ONLY.
1350 'THIS CASE HOULD HAPPEN ONLY FROM NODE 2<^ . NO REACTION TIME NECESSARY,
1370 FLAG=0: WHERE=2
1380 IF NFR0M = 23<4 AND MARK = 1 THEN
1390 IF TGT2=1 THEN T=TP:GOTO 1^20
1^00 IF TGT2=0 THEN GOSUB 1170:RETURN
l<i\Q END IF
IF NFR0M = 2'^ AND MARK = 1 THEN T = TP
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
l<i20 TGT2SAM = TGT2SAM+1
NSAM1=TGT2SAM
GOSUB 'i^0:TGT2SAM = NSAMl :IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
1*130 NFR0M = 2:G0SUB 530:IF FLAG = 1 THEN RETURN
l^^O TGT2=TGT:IF MARK=1 THEN RETURN
1<450 IF TGT2= THEN RETURN
1^60 IF TGT2 = 1 THEfJ GOTO 1'h20
1^70 RETURN
1^80 'SI: 'TGTl LEFT ONLY
1A90 'NO REACTION TIME NECESSARY
FLAG = 0: IJHERE = 1
IF T >= TP THEtJ T = TP
1510 TGT1SAM=TGT1SAM+1
N5AM1=TGT1SAM
GOSUB <i^O:TGTlSAM = NSAMl :IF FLAG = 1 THEN RETURN
1520 NFROr' = l :GOSUB 530: IF FLAG = 1 THEN RETURtJ
1530 TGT1=TGT:IF nARK=l THEN RETURN
15^0 IF TGT1=0 THEfJ RETURN
ir-50 IF TGT1 = 1 THEN GOTO 1510
1560 RETURN
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•xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx NUMERICAL STATISTIC xxxxxxxxx
1570 'STATISTIC:
•TOTALSAM: TOTAL SAMS HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM THE N SAMPLE SIZE
•EK: EXPECTED NUMBER OF TARGETS BEING KILLED.
'SS: SHIP SURVIVABILITY AGAINST (^ TARGETS.
•ESA: EXPECTED « OF DEFENSE SUCCESSFULLY.
BG(I, J,K)=TGTKILLED 'TGTs ARE KILLED BY SAM
LEAKTHRUd, J,K)=TLEAK 'TGTs GET THRU THE SAM DEFENSE












































CIWS: 'IN CINS MODE, CIWS SUBROUTINE
CIl-ISFLAG = l




IF CIWSDTGT < CIHSDTGTP THEN CIW5DTGT=CIH3DTGTP : CIWST=CIHSTP
CIWSSTARTT = (CIHSDTGT-MI))(6 + CIWST 'CINSSTARTT. THE TIME THE CIWS MODE STARTE
D
IF CIWSDTGT >= 3 THEfJ '3 NM=(5 SEC)x(l/6 ) ( NM/SEC) + 2NM
CINST=(CIWSDTGT-3)^6+CIWST '5 SEC IS THE CIWS REACTION TIME
END IF
•REACTION AND START FIRING THE CIWS:
CIW5T=CIWST+CIWSRT 'THE TIME CIW3 FIRE BY ADDING THE REACTION TIME




IF CII-J5DTGT <= 0.1
'FIRItJG:
G05UB SEEKPK
CIliST = CIll3T + C0NTFIRET
CIllSDTGT = RANGE-CIHST/6
GOSUB AA
IF CINSDTGT <= 0.1 THEN
IF TGT=1 THEN GOTO 1590
1600 IF MFR0M=123'4 OR NFR0M = 13'^
RETURN
,6 THEN 0UCH=1 : GOTO 1600
•THE CIIIST HERE IS THE TIME TO CHECK PK
0UCH=1: GOTO 1600
OR NFR0M=23^ THEN 0UCH=1
1610
<= 10 AND NFR0M=1234 THEN






END IF :GOTO 1610
IF NFR0M = 123<4 THEN TGT = TGT1
IF NFR0M=15^ THEN TGT=TGT1
IF NFR0M=23A THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFR0M=3^ THEN TGT=TGT3
IF NFR0M = 1^ THEtJ TGT=TGT1
IF NFR0M=2^ THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFR0M=1 THEfJ TGT = TGT1
IF NFR0M=2 THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFR0M = 3 THEfJ TGT = TGT5























IF R <= AAPK THEN TGT=0 : AR=AR+1
=
ARC=1
IF RANGE <= 10 AND NFR0M=123^ THEN TGT2=TGT: GOTO 1620
IF NFR0M=123<i
IF NFR0M^13^





































IF DIFF > £.6 THEN AAPK = 0.6 : C0fJTFIRET=8
IF DIFF > 6.6 AND DIFF <= 8.6 THEN AAPK= . 05)fCONTFIRET+ . 2
IF DIFF > ^.6 AND DIFF <= 6.6 THEN AAPK= .
1
XCONTFIRET- . 1







Option 1 SAM & CIWS
RT FW^GE EK(SAM) EK(CIWS) EK(COMB) EKfS&C( + /-)EWl PENETEiATOR SS
PK(SAM):=0.7 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK{CHAFF) =0.0
30 30 3.03 0.48 0.00 3.51 0.49 0.61
30 25 2.98 0.49 0.00 3.48 0.52 0.58
30 20 1.96 0.67 0.00 2.63 1.37 0.07
30 1 5 1.54 0.64 0.00 2.18 1.82 0.00
30 1 0.70 0.53 0.00 1.23 2.77 0.00
PK(SAM).=0.5 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK(CHAFF) =0.0
30 30 2.45 0,58 0.00 3.03 0.97 0.35
30 25 2.34 0.62 0.00 2.96 1.04 0.30
30 20 1.62 0.67 0.00 2.29 1.71 0.04
30 1 5 1.12 0.62 0.00 1.74 2.26 0.00
30 1 0.50 0.52 0.00 1.02 2.98 0.00
PK(SAM):=0.3 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK(CHAFF):=0.0
30 30 1.69 0.61 0.00 2.30 1.70 0.12
30 35 1.57 0.67 0.00 2.23 1.77 0.09
30 20 1.09 0.67 0.00 1.76 2.24 0.01
30 15 0.67 0.61 0.00 1.27 2.73 0.00
30 1 0.30 0.53 0.00 0.83 3.14 0.00
Option 2 SAM & CIWS & EW
RT RANGE EK(SAM) EK(CIWS^ EKfCOMB) EKfS&C(>/-)EWl PENETRATOR SS
PK(SAM):=0./ F'K(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF) == 0.4
30 30 3.02 0.28 0.44 3.73 0.27 0.78
30 25 2.98 0.29 0.43 3.70 0.30 0.75
30 20 1 .96 0.59 0.58 3.13 0.87 0,36
30 1 5 1.55 0.60 0.58 2.72 1.28 0.23
30 1 0.70 0.34 0.58 1.62 2.38 0.00
PK(SAM) ==0.£ P K(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF) ==0.4
30 30 2.42 0.42 0.54 3.38 0.62 0.56
30 25 2.33 0,48 0.53 3.34 0.66 0.53
30 20 1.62 0.62 0.59 2.83 1.17 0.26
30 1 5 1.12 0.58 0.58 2.27 1.73 0,14
30 1 0.50 0,34 0.58 1.42 2.58 0.00
PK(SAM)==0.3 PK(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF) ==0,4
30 30 1.69 0.53 0.57 2,80 1.20 0.29
30 35 1.57 0.60 0.58 2.74 1.26 0.27
30 20 1.08 0.63 0.58 2.29 1.71 0.12
30 1 5 0.66 0.55 0,58 1.79 2.21 0.06
30 10 0.30 0.34 0.58 1.22 2.78 0.00
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Option 3 SAM & CIWS & Improved EW
RT FWJGE EK(SAM) EK(CIWS) EK(COMB) EKfS&C( + /-)EWl PENETRATOn SS
PK(SAM):=0.7 PK(ECM)=0.5 PK(CHAFF) ==0.6
30 30 3.02 0.20 0.60 3.82 0.18 0.84
30 25 2.99 0.22 0.59 3.80 0.20 0.82
30 20 1.96 0.57 0.80 3.34 0.66 0.48
30 1 5 1.55 0.60 0.80 2.95 1.05 0.32
30 1 0.70 0.34 0.80 1.84 2.18 0.00
PK(SAM) =.0.5 PK(ECM)=0.5 PK(CHAFF)== 0.6
30 30 2.43 0.36 0.74 3.53 0.47 0.64
30 25 2.34 0.43 0.74 3.50 0.50 0.62
30 20 1.62 0.61 0.80 3.04 0.96 0.34
30 1 5 1.12 0.58 0.79 2.49 1.51 0.19
30 10 0.50 0.34 0.80 1.64 2.36 0.00
PK(SAM) ==0.3 PK{ECM)=0.5 PK(CHAFF)==0.6
30 30 1.69 0.51 0.79 2.99 1.01 0.35
30 35 1.57 0.58 0.79 2.94 1.06 0.34
30 20 1.07 0.63 0.81 2.51 1.49 0.16
30 1 5 0.66 0.54 0.80 2.00 2.00 0.08
30 1 0.30 0.33 0.80 1.44 2.58 0.00





EK(SAM) EK(CIWS) EK(COMB) EKfS&C( + /-)EWl PENETFIATOR SS
PK(SAM) ==0.7 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK(CHAFF) = 0.0
20 30 3.34 0.35 0.00 3.69 0.31 0.74
20 25 3.02 0.49 0.00 3.51 0.49 0.60
20 20 2.17 0.66 0.00 2.83 1.17 0.16
20 1 5 1.54 0.67 0.00 2.21 1.79 0.00
20 1 1.40 0.67 0.00 2.07 1.93 0.00
PK(SAM) ==0.5 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK(CHAFF) = 0.0
20 30 2.70 0.53 0.00 3.22 0.78 0.47
20 25 2.40 0.61 0.00 3.01 0.99 0.34
20 20 1.83 0.63 0.00 2.46 1.54 0.10
20 1 5 1.11 0.66 0.00 1.77 2.23 0.00
20 1 1.00 0.67 0.00 1.67 2.33 0.00
PK(SAM) ==0.3 PK(ECM)=0.0 PK(CHAFF) = 0.0
20 30 1.77 0.60 0.00 2.37 1.63 0.17
20 25 1.62 0.65 0.00 2.27 1.73 0.1 1 •
20 20 1.22 0.60 0.00 1.82 2.18 0.04
20 1 5 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.34 2.66 0.00
20 1 0.61 0.67 0.00 1.29 2.71 0.00
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Option 5 Improved SAM & CIWS & EW
RT FViNGE EK(SAM) EK(CIWS) EK(COMB) EKfS&C( + /-)EW] PENETHATOR SS
PK{SAM):=0.7 PK(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF)== 0.4
20 30 3.35 0.19 0.30 3.84 0,16 0.87
20 25 3.03 0.27 0.43 3.72 0.28 0.77
20 20 2.17 0.52 0.57 3.27 0.73 0.45
20 1 5 1.55 0.63 0.59 2.77 1.23 0.24
20 1 1.40 0.61 0.58 2.59 1.41 0.17
PK(SAM) ==0.5 PK(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF)==0.4
20 30 2.68 0.35 0.47 3.51 0.49 0.65
20 25 2.40 0.44 0.53 3.37 0.63 0.55
20 20 1.85 0.55 0.57 2.97 1.03 0.35
20 1 5 1.12 0.64 0.58 2.34 1.66 0.14
20 1 0.99 0.61 0.58 2.17 1.83 0.09
PK(SAM)==0.3 PK(ECM)=0.3 PK(CHAFF)== 0.4
20 30 1.79 0.48 0.56 2.83 1.17 0.35
20 25 1.61 0.57 0.57 2.75 1.25 0.28
20 20 1.23 0.54 0.58 2.35 1.65 0.17
20 1 5 0.66 0.63 0.58 1.87 2.13 0.05
20 1 0.62 0.61 0.58 1.80 2.20 0.03
Option 6 Improved SAM & CIWS & Improved EW



















20 30 3.34 0.13
20 25 3.03 0.19
20 20 2.16 0.50
20 1 5 1.55 0.63
20 1 1.40 0.60
PK(SAM) ==0.5i PK{ECM)=0.5
20 30 2.69 0.29
20 25 2.40 0.38
20 20 1.84 0.53
20 1 5 1.13 0.63
20 1 1.00 0.60
PK(SAM) ==0.3 PK(ECM)=0.5
20 30 1.78 0.47
20 25 1.61 0.55
20 20 1.22 0.53
20 1 5 0.66 0.63
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